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1 Introduction
Advances in information technology have introduced unprecedented possibilities of collecting,
storing, transmitting, and analyzing personal information. For example, consumers’ purchases
at supermarkets, internet stores, and transactions at financial institutions provide firms with
a wealth of internally collected personal information on disposable income, family size, age,
and other personal identifying data that determine their purchasing behavior. Many businesses
use this personal information for commercial purposes and segment their markets into specific
customer categories. Moreover, firms often rely on marketed consumer data obtained externally
from third parties that collect information on consumers’ preferences.
At the same time, the collection, use, and dissemination of personal information have in-
troduced privacy concerns. There is much debate on how the flow of information within and
between firms should be organized, and whether existing privacy laws should be amended. Ac-
cording to Stigler (1980), privacy “connotes the restriction of the collection or use of information
about a person or corporation; the information in question “belongs” to the individual.” This
is also what Posner (1981), in defining privacy, refers to as “concealment of information.” In
this paper, we deal with this meaning of privacy in that privacy policies may shape information
regarding a customer’s willingness to pay.1
The literature on the economics of privacy as developed by Hirshleifer (1980), Stigler (1980),
and Posner (1981) argues that in a perfectly competitive world different property rights about
ownership of information do not affect the efficient amount of information flow. Stigler (1980)
concludes that in voluntary transactions, and provided the conditions of competition are sat-
isfied, there is no reason to protect any one party. Given the legal environment of privacy
protection, an efficient amount of information flow will take place. Still, legislators in many
countries have dealt differently with privacy concerns in recent decades. Staten and Cate (2003)
observe that “the concept that consumers should have the legal right to exercise some degree of
choice over commercial use of personal information has become an accepted principle underpin-
ning public policy toward privacy in the United States. However, the form in which that choice
must be offered is far from settled” (p. 748). Staten and Cate (2003) argue that the form of
1Posner (1981) also considers “peace and quiet” and “freedom and autonomy” as two other definitions of
privacy. Privacy has not only been studied from an economic perspective but also by other disciplines such
as law or social psychology (see Hui and Png (2006) for a recent overview). While these other disciplines study
individuals’ concerns about privacy invasion and how government should address these, economists typically focus
on how consumer information affects social efficiency.
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privacy policies differently impacts consumers and businesses because of the transaction costs
involved in exercising the legal right to the commercial use of personal consumer information.
The contribution of our paper is to identify the welfare effects of different privacy policies in
a model with localized competition when consumers incur transaction costs in exercising their
legal right to manage their own privacy. While the literature on privacy is vast and growing,
there is little theoretical analysis on firms’ strategic interactions and the welfare implications of
specific privacy policies. We model this research question by comparing three different privacy
policies that impose legal restrictions on the handling of personal consumer information.
The first privacy policy is an “opt-out” system. Under opt out, a firm that “intends to share
non-public customer information with third parties ... must give consumers an opportunity to
deny them permission to do so, or opt out” (Lacker (2002)). Firms can share that information
with third parties when the consumer does not object to the use of this non-public or personal
information.2 In the US, in those industries where the law currently requires that consumers be
given a choice, opt out is the privacy policy most commonly used. Examples where the opt-out
system applies include the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the 2000 Fair Credit Reporting Act,
or the 2000 Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Under these Acts, firms must provide the
consumer with the possibility of opting out when they plan to share personal information.
The second privacy policy is an “opt-in” system. Under opt in, firms have “to obtain a
consumer’s explicit consent before sharing personal information about them” (Lacker (2002)).
Opt in permits the use of personal information within the organization but requires the con-
sumer’s explicit consent before personal information can be disclosed to third parties outside the
organization.3 Interestingly, many states in the US have adopted or are considering regulatory
2Not all firms offer the same level of detail when sharing information. For example, Adobe Systems Inc. online
privacy policy states that “[y]our personal information is also used to track customer preferences and keep you
informed about product upgrades, special offers, and other products and services of Adobe and selected third
parties unless you have opted not to receive such communications or such communications are prohibited by law.”
In another instance, only aggregated information is shared with third parties. For example, the New York Times
writes in its online privacy policy “[w]e also use demographic and preference information to allow advertising
banners on our Web site to be targeted, in aggregate, to the users for whom they are most pertinent. This means
that users see advertising that is most likely to interest them, and advertisers send their messages to people who
are most likely to be receptive, improving both the viewer’s experience and the effectiveness of the ads.” Finally,
Google’s information sharing policy is even more aggregated since “[w]e may share with third parties certain
pieces of aggregated, non-personal information, such as the number of users who searched for a particular term,
for example, or how many users clicked on a particular advertisement. Such information does not identify you
individually.”
3Staten and Cate (2003) distinguish between “Third-Party Sharing Opt-In” and “Affiliate Sharing Opt-In.”
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actions regarding the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in favor of the stricter privacy opt-in standard
for sharing information with third parties. In the European Union, the opt-in system underlies
the 1995 European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC. The European Union Data
Protection Directive of 1995 provides consumers in the EU member states with protections that
emphasize the opt-in as opposed to the opt-out model.
Finally, the third privacy policy can be considered as a benchmark case that guarantees
anonymity.4 With anonymity, all information collection or storage is prohibited, even within a
firm. The implication then is that firms cannot use information to segment customers.
Both the opt-in and opt-out regimes allocate the property rights over personal information
to the consumer. When the consumer does not incur any costs in opting in or opting out, these
two regimes provide firms with equal access to customer information. For example, if consumers
find it beneficial to protect their privacy, they will exercise their option under the opt out privacy
policy, but will not do so under opt in. The opposite holds when consumers find it beneficial
to release their personal information. However, Staten and Cate (2003) report low exercise
rates for both the opt-out and opt-in systems, with generally fewer than 10% of consumers
exercising their option.5 These low numbers suggest that consumers find it costly to exercise
their option. When opting in or out becomes too costly, the two privacy policies no longer
coincide and differently influence firms’ access to detailed customer information. In particular,
when consumers find it too costly to opt out, personal information about consumers flows unre-
strictedly in the economy, and firms can therefore rely on marketed personal information about
potential or existing customers to set prices. When consumers find it too costly to opt in, the
opt-in system effectively prevents firms from disseminating information about their customers
and consequently there will not be a market for personal customer information. That is, when
no consumer opts in, new entering firms cannot base their strategic decisions on consumer infor-
mation obtained from third parties. Firms, however, are allowed to store information internally,
and consequently can use the information they obtain over the course of a customer relationship
in their pricing decisions. In sum, when consumers find it costly to exercise their option, public
Both variants require opt-in consent before information can be disclosed to third parties. The distinction is that
the second puts more restrictions on what can be disclosed to whom.
4This is often labelled as “blanket opt-in” (see Staten and Cate (2003)).
5Staten and Cate (2003) also cite the case of U.S. West which conducted an affirmative consent trial. The
company asked its customers for permission to analyze their calling patterns, but a direct mailing resulted only
in a response rate of 5 to 11 %. Eventually, U.S. West decided that opt in was not a profitable business model as
the subsequent telemarketing test resulted in a prohibitive cost of $29 to $34 per positive response.
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policy towards privacy affects the quality of firms’ access to better and more detailed customer
information (see also Armstrong (2006)). Finally, when consumers do not exercise their option,
opt out results in the lowest degree of privacy protection as personal information is marketed,
opt in offers an intermediate degree of protection as personal information flows only within a
firm, and anonymity obviously provides the highest degree of protection.
This paper studies the welfare implications of three different privacy policies — opt in, opt
out, and anonymity — employing a two-period version of the Salop (1979) address model of
localized competition. This model allows us to study welfare when public policy towards privacy
determines (i) the quality of firms’ access to customer information; (ii) firms’ ability to practice
different forms of price discrimination; and (iii) firms’ entry decisions. We assume that consumers
decide where to buy based on the firms’ current and expected future prices, firms’ locations, and
their own preferences. In our model, the different privacy policies shape the strategic decisions
of firms since competitive interactions — prices and entry decisions — are determined by the
flow of information. In particular, when consumers find it too costly to exercise their option
under the opt-in regime, there is not any marketed personal information about potential or
existing customers available. As a result, firms rely only on internally stored personal consumer
information stemming from their past customers’ purchasing habits. Firms, then, learn about
consumers’ brand preferences only by first building up a customer base, and practice behavior-
based price discrimination as developed in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). When consumers find it
too costly to exercise their option under the opt-out regime, firms have access to marketed data
on potential customers and are then able to immediately segment consumers by practicing third-
degree price discrimination. Finally, under the anonymity regime firms cannot rely either on
market-based or on internally stored personal consumer information for their pricing decisions.
As a result, they resort to uniform pricing. Our free-entry analysis reveals that the opt-out
regime produces better welfare results than the anonymity regime, which in its turn is better
than the opt-in regime. Therefore, from a social welfare point of view, it matters whether opt
out or opt in is adopted as the privacy standard.
Opt out performs better than anonymity, a result determined by the following trade-off. On
the one hand, with opt out and for a given number of firms, suppliers serve some consumers
with a low preference for their brand; this results in higher “transportation costs” compared
to anonymity where inefficient allocation does not take place. On the other hand, opt out
results in “all-out” competition relative to anonymity in that the available information sharpens
competition for a given number of firms. Consequently, fewer firms enter with opt out than with
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anonymity. The overall effect is such that total welfare increases more with opt out than with
anonymity. Although some consumers are not served by their most nearby supplier, increased
competition sufficiently reduces excessive entry to enhance total welfare.
In contrast to anonymity, opt in reduces total welfare. Restricting the use of personal
information on past purchasing behavior to within a firm leads to lower welfare results than
completely banning the flow of information within and across firms. This result stems from
the competitive interactions in the two periods. First, note that for a given number of firms,
first-period competition with opt in results in higher first-period prices relative to a model with
anonymity. The reasoning is that first-period competition with opt in is also determined by the
anticipated firm’s second-period pricing behavior, making first-period demand less elastic. The
opt-in and anonymity regimes result in consumers being served by their most preferred supplier
in the first period. Thus higher first-period profits with opt in augment excessive entry. Second,
opt in implies that firms use internally collected information in the second period. This results
in (1) all-out competition relative to the anonymity regime and (2) inefficient allocation as some
consumers are served by a non-nearby supplier. The overall effect is that the lower first-period
competition leading to additional entry and the inefficient second-period allocation dominate
the impact of all-out second-period competition. The conclusion then is that opt in leads to
lower welfare than anonymity. Thus, when consumers find it too costly to exercise their option,
welfare conclusions crucially hinge on privacy policies that determine the flow of information.
Furthermore, we also look at the incentives for consumers to exercise their option to opt in or
opt out. We find that all consumers opt in only when its cost is sufficiently low. The reasoning
is that prices are lower when personal information is marketed. All consumers exercise their
option when the decrease in price outweighs the cost of opting in. Consumers never want to use
their option to opt out, as prices would go up by preventing personal information from being
marketed.
Our model relates to the literature on behavior-based price discrimination. Recently, Taylor
(2004) studied the dynamic strategic pricing behavior of a monopoly (“firm 1”) when there is
a market for customer information. Consumers are heterogenous and their private valuations
for firm 1’s goods are positively correlated with other goods offered by another monopoly “firm
2.” A consumer’s purchasing decision at firm 1 is therefore valuable to firm 2. Taylor examines
an anonymity regime in which the sale of customer information is not possible, and a disclosure
regime in which firm 1 may compile and sell its customer list to firm 2 which uses it to price
discriminate. When consumers are myopic, firm 1 may from time to time charge high prices in
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order to elicit information about its customers’ willingness to pay. Welfare critically depends
on whether average prices are high or low. When consumers anticipate the selling of their
purchasing behavior, they may strategically refuse to buy from firm 1 when it is charging high
prices in order to get a lower price at firm 2. This strategic customer behavior reduces the value
of a customer list and may force firms to price low. When consumers anticipate the selling of a
customer list, a firm might like to commit not to sell its customer list.6 This may be interpreted
as firms favoring “opt in.”
In a similar vein, Acquisti and Varian (2005) analyze a monopolist’s optimal intertemporal
pricing strategy. They show that when enhanced services can be offered to previous customers,
the selling firm will find it optimal to condition its prices on consumers’ purchasing history. Ac-
quisti and Varian show that when competing firms offer enhanced services to returning consumers
it always pays for firms to condition their prices on consumers’ purchasing history. Consumers
who prize this personalized service will remain with their current provider as they will not be
offered the enhanced service when switching to another provider. Taylor (2004) and Acquisti
and Varian (2005) mainly concentrate on monopoly or oligopoly behavior with or without the
sale of consumer information. Our paper, in contrast, looks at the competitive and welfare
effects of different privacy policies in a two-period model of free entry.
As in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), our paper studies two-period competition where firms
can price discriminate in the second period between their own previous customers and other
customers.7 Each firm charges a high price to its previous customers (its strong market) and
a low price to rivals’ first-period customers (its weak market). Since one firm’s weak market
is the other firm’s strong market, the firms’ best-responses are asymmetric and second-period
competition drives prices down as in Corts (1998). While these papers consider duopoly, we
are interested in the extent to which the different forms of price discrimination that result from
the three privacy policies affect welfare under free entry. In their literature review Armstrong
(2006) and Stole (2005) remark that free entry typically results in too much entry from a social
welfare point of view. When price discrimination increases profits, excessive entry worsens. In
contrast, price discrimination lessens excessive entry when it reduces oligopoly profits.8 Liu and
Serfes (2005) consider a one-period free-entry analysis where the quality of marketed consumer
6See also Calzolari and Pavan (2005).
7Villas-Boas (1999) considers an overlapping generations model where firms recognize their own customers but
cannot distinguish new entering consumers from others who previously bought from rivals.
8For another thorough review on the recent developments of price discrimination, see Villas-Boas and Fuden-
berg (2005).
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information determines the degree of segmentation. They vary the degree of possible consumer
segmentation, and find that moderate segmentation results in the most efficient free-entry out-
come. Our paper, in contrast, studies how privacy protection (i) shapes a firm’s ability to collect
and use customer information, (ii) bears on a firm’s intertemporal behavior-based pricing strat-
egy, and (iii) changes welfare through firms’ entry decisions. Our two-period free-entry analysis
reveals that social welfare is non-monotonic in the degree of privacy protection. Opt out is the
socially preferred privacy policy while opt in socially underperforms anonymity.
Section 2 develops the analysis of the three privacy policies, while Section 3 offers the main
results of our paper by comparing the three privacy policies. Section 4 provides a discussion and
conclusion.
2 Privacy Policies
Consider a market where a continuum of consumers with unit mass is uniformly distributed
along a circle with circumference one. Consumers live for two periods, have constant preferences
over time, and have a unit demand for non-durable goods in each period. Consumers’ willingness
to pay v is high enough so as to guarantee that all consumers buy in each period. A consumer
located at distance x from firm i (with i = 1, ..., N) derives utility
v − tx− piτ
from consuming one unit of goods in period τ (with τ = 1, 2) and purchased from firm i, where
t denotes the linear transportation cost per unit of distance and piτ the price paid at firm i.
9
With the exception of transportation costs, switching between sellers is cost-free, and there is
no possibility of arbitrage between consumers.
Firms and consumers have a common discount factor 0 ≤ δ < 1. Prior to first-period
competition, N firms decide to enter the market for both periods and locate equidistantly along
the circle. The cost of entry is (1 + δ)F and is sunk up front at τ = 1. This entry cost structure
allows for a direct comparison with a one-period Salop model where the entry cost equals F .
Thus firms commit to enter for both periods before competition starts. Firms start to compete
for consumers at τ = 1. Depending on the privacy policy, firms do or do not have information
about consumers prior to first-period competition. In period τ = 2 firms compete again for
9We assume that the available gross surplus v does not depend on the different privacy policies. Consumer
surplus, however, may suffer from giving up privacy.
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consumers. The information available about their customer base or future clientele is again
determined by the privacy policy.
Firms compete in prices during each period and cannot commit to future prices; that is, we
do not consider long-term contracts. Prices are set simultaneously in both periods. In contrast to
Taylor (2004) our model is not set up to analyze the market for consumer information. Instead,
our objective is to investigate the implications of three different privacy policies on interfirm
competition and their consequences for welfare. To study these effects in isolation, we assume
that firms can access information, when available, at zero cost.
2.1 Opt in
With opt in, consumers must explicitly consent to third-party use of personal data. In line
with empirical evidence already referred to in the Introduction, we make the simplifying as-
sumption that all consumers face substantial transaction costs such that they do not opt in. As
a result, all consumers do not permit personal information about their purchasing patterns in
related industries to become publicly available. Firms therefore lack specific information about
consumers before competing in the first period and before setting prices. Firms then need to
resort to uniform pricing in the first period. However, the opt-in regime allows firms to store
information about their customers internally and to use this information in their second-period
pricing strategies. That is, firms are able to practice purchase history-based pricing in the sec-
ond period. We assume that a firm can store information about whether a consumer patronized
its shop in period one. The implication then is that firms in the second period can set different
prices to those offered to their first-period consumers and other consumers. This is optimal
as first-period consumers have revealed they have a “higher preference” for that firm, and are
willing to pay higher prices for products from that firm. We first treat the oligopolistic setting
based on the duopoly analysis of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). Then we turn to free entry and
social welfare, respectively.
2.1.1 Oligopoly
Consider first an oligopoly situation with N firms that are located symmetrically on the circle.
The circle can then be subdivided into N neighborhoods. Neighborhood ij is the neighborhood
where firms i and j (with i, j = 1, ..., N and i 6= j) compete with each other (so effectively
j = i + 1 for all i = 1, ..., N − 1, and j = 1 for i = N). The distance between firms i and
j equals 1/N for any neighborhood. As our analysis concentrates on symmetric situations, let
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b denote the position of the indifferent consumer in the first period located in between i and
j, with 0 ≤ b ≤ 1/N . Denote by pij2 firm i’s second-period price offered to customers of firm
j’s first-period market. Denote by x0 the position of the consumer in the second period who is
indifferent between switching from i to j or staying with i. Similarly, y0 is the position of the
consumer in the second period who is indifferent between switching from j to i or staying with
j. It should be clear that x0 ≤ b and y0 ≥ b.
We start the analysis with second-period competition. Firm i has served the market segment
0 ≤ b ≤ 1/N in the first period, while firm j served 1/N − b. The position of the second-period
customer x0, indifferent between switching from i to j, is such that
pii2 + tx
0 = pji2 + t(
1
N
− x0)
and the position of the second-period customer y0 indifferent between switching from j to i,
equals
pjj2 + t(
1
N
− y0) = pij2 + ty0.
Firm i maximizes its second-period profits in the neighborhood ij
Πi2(p
ii
2 , p
ij
2 ) ≡ pii2 x0 + p
ij
2 (y
0 − b)
while firm j maximizes
Πj2(p
jj
2 , p
ji
2 ) ≡ p
jj
2 (
1
N
− y0) + pji2 (b− x0).
The first-order conditions are
pii2 = 0.5(p
ji
2 +
t
N
)
pij2 = 0.5(p
jj
2 +
t
N
− 2tb)
pjj2 = 0.5(p
ij
2 +
t
N
)
pji2 = 0.5(p
ii
2 + 2tb−
t
N
).
A symmetric solution for the second period yields
pii2 = t(2b+
1
N
)/3
pij2 = t(
3
N
− 4b)/3
pjj2 = t(
3
N
− 2b)/3
pji2 = t(4b−
1
N
)/3.
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Note that the first-period market share b shapes second-period competition. In particular,
a greater b relaxes competition in i’s first-period market but sharpens competition in j’s first-
period market. We now turn to first-period competition, which determines the first-period
market share.10 In the first period, the indifferent forward-looking consumer anticipates that
in the second period the “poaching firm” will offer attractive prices. That is the indifferent
consumer anticipates that it will be beneficial in the second period to visit the rival’s shop.
Given the discount rate δ, the indifferent first-period consumer located at b is characterized by
pi1 + tb+ δ[p
ji
2 + t(
1
N
− b)] = pj1 + t(
1
N
− b) + δ(pij2 + tb)
or
b =
pj1 − pi1 + δ(p
ij
2 − p
ji
2 ) +
t
N (1− δ)
2t(1− δ) .
In words, the consumer with position b is indifferent between buying in the first period from
firm i at price pi1 and switching to j in the second period, or buying from j in the first period
at price pj1 and switching to firm i in period two.
The discounted total profits look like
Πi(pi1, p
j
1) ≡ pi1b+ δ[Πi2(pii2 , p
ij
2 )]
for firm i and
Πj(pi1, p
j
1) ≡ p
j
1(
1
N
− b) + δ[Πj2(p
jj
2 , p
ji
2 )]
for firm j. The first-order conditions are
pi1 =
t(δ2+6δ+9)
N + p
j
1 (9− 7δ)
2 (9− 2δ)
pj1 =
t(δ2+6δ+9)
N + p
i
1 (9− 7δ)
2 (9− 2δ) .
A symmetric solution yields
pi1 = p
j
1 =
t(δ + 3)
3N
.
The symmetric equilibrium then implies b = 12N , resulting in
pii2 = p
jj
2 =
2t
3N
pij2 = p
ji
2 =
t
3N
.
10The analysis assumes that firms attract market share only from neighborhoods adjacent to their own locations.
We return to this at the end of this section.
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Comparison of prices reveals that
pi1 = p
j
1 > p
ii
2 = p
jj
2 > p
ij
2 = p
ji
2 .
Thus, first-period prices exceed second-period prices. Moreover first-period prices are higher
than in a standard Salop model with uniform pricing, where prices would equal t/N . The
reasoning stems from the lower elasticity of first-period demand relative to the static Salop
model. This lower elasticity relaxes first-period competition.
We also find that
x0 =
1
3N
y0 =
2
3N
,
implying that one third of all consumers are served by their less preferred supplier in the second
period, whereas all consumers are served by their most preferred supplier in the first period.11
Firm i and j’s discounted total equilibrium profits in neighborhood ij look like
Πi = Πj =
t (9 + 8δ)
18N2
. (1)
This analysis leads to similar results as in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). Note, however, that
our oligopoly framework allows for more than two firms. We should therefore consider whether
firms cannot engage in profitable deviations by setting “supercompetitive prices” — prices with
which a firm captures all customers on both sides of the closest neigbouring brand — as described
in Salop (1979). Such a price discontinuously shifts the deviator’s demand outwards. While in
Salop’s model such deviations are unprofitable, our two-period framework may render such a
deviation worthwhile. The reasoning is that although a deviation in the first period results in
lower first-period profits, it may substantially relax competition in the next period. It turns
out that such a deviation becomes unprofitable (i) with sufficiently convex transportation costs
as the discontinuous shift in the demand curve from setting a supercompetitive price no longer
exists; (ii) when assuming that δ is sufficiently low (i.e. δ < 9/28);12 or (iii) when consumers
11The condition that all consumers buy in the first period is guaranteed when v ≥
max [t/2N + t(δ + 3)/3N, 2t(2 + δ)/3N ] . Otherwise, some consumers to the left of x0 and to the right of
y0 would strategically refrain from purchasing in period 1. By doing so, they could benefit from the lowest
second-period prices at the closest shop.
12To see this, start from the candidate equilibrium prices pi1 = p
j
1 = t(δ+3)/3N . Given these prices, firm i can
attract a first-period market share of 3/N by lowering its price with t/N and setting a first-period supercompetitive
12
only consider patronizing the two closest shops, for example because it is too costly to examine
prices in non-neigbouring firms. Note that the duopoly setting of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)
implies that consumers can only choose between the two neighboring firms, and therefore the
duopoly setting should not deal with supercompetitive prices. Our analysis will concentrate on
the competitive equilibrium resulting in Eq. (1) as this allows us to focus on free entry and to
compare our results with opt out and anonymity.
2.1.2 Free Entry
We employ the results from the oligopoly case in order to study free entry. Recall that firms
simultaneously decide whether to enter or not, and that entry costs are (1 + δ)F . After entry
has occurred, the firms play the two-period game as analyzed in the previous subsection. As
prices with opt in decline from period 1 to period 2, additional entry in the second period of
the game (at a cost F ) is unprofitable. Our free-entry equilibrium of the two-period model is
therefore entry-proof in the second period.
As firm i attracts consumers from its two nearby neighborhoods, profits double those of Eq.
(1). Each firm’s discounted total variable profits with opt in equal
ΠiIN =
t (9 + 8δ)
9N2
.
The free-entry condition with opt in amounts to
ΠiIN − (1 + δ)F = 0.
The equilibrium number of firms NfIN then becomes
NfIN =
s
t(9 + 8δ)
9 (1 + δ)F
.
How to evaluate welfare with opt in? Welfare losses with opt in under free-entry become
W fIN = 2N
f
IN t[
Z 1/2NfIN
0
xdx+δ(
Z 1/3NfIN
0
xdx+
Z 1/2NfIN
1/3NfIN
(1/NfIN − x)dx)] +N
f
IN (1 + δ)F
=
(45 + 43δ)
12
s
tF (1 + δ)
(9 + 8δ)
.
price equal to δ/3N . As a result, its first-period profits will equal δt/N2. Under the assumption that the non-
adjacent firms do not adopt their pricing strategies, the second-period prices and market shares are t/N and 1/N ,
respectively, as its adjacent firms will not have served any consumers in the first period. Its discounted profits,
then, are 2δt/N2. This expression is larger then Eq. (1) whenever δ > 9/28. Note that if the non-adjacent firms
were also to adjust their prices, they would have an incentive to become more aggressive. Therefore the condition
δ < 9/28 is a sufficient condition but not a necessary condition.
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The first term between the square brackets reflects the first-period transportation costs since
consumers visit their most preferred supplier. The second term captures the discounted second-
period transportation costs. In the second period some inefficient allocation takes place: con-
sumers in the middle of each neighborhood visit a “more distant” firm to take advantage of the
more attractive second-period price. The third term reflects total entry costs.
2.1.3 Social Planner
How many firms will a social planner allow? And what are the associated welfare losses?
Suppose that the social planner controls the (maximum) number of firms entering the market
but cannot control their oligopolistic behavior once they have entered. It follows that firms will
implement “purchase-history based price discrimination”, since it is dominant for firms to price
discriminate in period two. Entry still implies a social cost (1 + δ)F . The welfare losses to be
minimized by the social planner are
WIN = 2nt[
Z 1/2n
0
xdx+δ(
Z 1/3n
0
xdx+
Z 1/2n
1/3n
(1/n− x)dx)] + n (1 + δ)F,
with n being the number of firms to be determined by the social planner. As with free entry,
the first term between the square brackets reflects the first-period transportation costs, while
the second term captures the discounted second-period transportation costs. Minimizing this
expression yields the socially optimal number of firms with opt in n∗IN ,
n∗IN =
s
t(9 + 11δ)
36 (1 + δ)F
.
This yields the following welfare losses
W ∗IN =
r
tF (11δ + 9) (1 + δ)
9
.
Notice that excessive entry takes place as
NfIN > n
∗
IN .
That is, the social planner restricts entry. We will further elaborate on these results when
comparing the different privacy policies in Section 3.
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2.2 Opt out
The opt-out system gives consumers the option to prohibit the sharing of their personal in-
formation. We model that consumers do not exercise the option to opt out as they may face
substantial transaction costs, are unaware of this option or may not find it beneficial to exer-
cise it. This is in line with actuality since only a very few consumers exercise this option. As
a result, consumers reveal personal information through their past purchases at other firms.
Consequently, each firm obtains marketed consumer information about consumers’ brand pref-
erences before first-period competition takes place. In particular, every firm is informed about
whether a consumer’s location is “closer to its shop” or not, as in Bester and Petrakis (1996).13
This assumption (i) maintains the essential characteristics of opt out as entrants have access
to customer information, (ii) buys us an easy comparison with opt in, and (iii) allows us to
analyze the symmetric outcome of a standard product differentiation model. Information on
customer location allows firms to practice third-degree price discrimination in the first period
between nearby consumers and others. This is optimal as consumers located nearby have a
“higher preference” for that firm but show a lower preference for firms further away. While
under opt out firms have access to a market for customer information, they could additionally
compile customer information themselves. However, to highlight the differences we treat opt
out as if firms rely on market-based customer information only and opt in as if firms have no
access to such a source. Before discussing competition in this setting it is important to remark
that first-period and second-period competition are independent of each other. The reasoning is
that firms use only exogenously available information in their pricing decisions. The first-period
market share does not affect second-period competition; each period can therefore be studied
separately, and prices and market shares will be identical across the two periods.
2.2.1 Oligopoly
Assume that N firms enter the market. Firms are located symmetrically on the circle. As before,
the distance between adjacent firms i and j in neigborhood ij equals 1/N . The informational
environment is such that firms i and j know whether or not a consumer is located in between 0
13Note that this assumption implies that each firm’s information set differs when the number of firms N > 2.
In other words, consumers known to firm i as living closest to its shop differ from j’s. An alternative assumption
is that firms have identical information about every consumer’s “brand ordering”. In a localized model of compe-
tition, however, these two assumptions produce identical results. The reasoning is that serving consumers from
non-adjacent neigborhoods turns out to be unprofitable.
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and 1/(2N), and in between 1/(2N) and 1/N . Firms i and j then will price discriminate between
consumers located in their hinterland and those located further away. Denote by pij firm i’s
price offered to customers “located further away” (closer to firm j). Denote by x the position of
the consumer in i’s hinterland who is indifferent between proximate firm i and the more distant
firm j. Similarly, y is the position of the consumer in j’s hinterland who is indifferent between
the proximate firm j and the more distant firm i. It should be clear that x ≤ 1/(2N) and
y ≥ 1/(2N).
The position of the customer x in i’s hinterland, indifferent between firm i and j, is such
that
piiτ + tx = p
ji
τ + t(
1
N
− x),
where piiτ is the price charged in period τ by firm i to a customer located in its hinterland.
Similarly pjiτ is the price charged in period τ by firm j to a customer in firm i’s hinterland. In a
similar fashion, the position of customer y in j’s hinterland, indifferent between j and i, equals
pjjτ + t(
1
N
− y) = pjjτ + ty.
Firm i maximizes its profits in the neighborhood ij during period τ
Πiτ (p
ii
τ , p
ij
τ ) ≡ piiτ x+ pijτ (y −
1
2N
).
The (necessary and sufficient) first-order conditions are
piiτ = 0.5(p
ji
τ +
t
N
)
pijτ = 0.5(p
jj
τ )
pjjτ = 0.5(p
ij
τ +
t
N
)
pjiτ = 0.5(p
ii
τ ).
A symmetric solution implies
piiτ = p
jj
τ =
2t
3N
pijτ = p
ji
τ =
t
3N
.
Firm i and j’s equilibrium per period profits in neighborhood ij look like
Πiτ = Π
j
τ =
5t
18N2
.
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As market shares in all periods τ are identical, total discounted profits per firm (net of fixed
costs) in neighborhood ij become
Πi = Πj =
5t (1 + δ)
18N2
.
2.2.2 Free Entry
What happens with free entry? Taking into account that firms realize profits in two adjacent
neighborhoods and incur fixed entry costs, the per firm discounted profits become
Πi =
5t (1 + δ)
9N2
− (1 + δ)F.
The free-entry equilibrium number of firms with opt out, NfOUT , becomes
NfOUT =
r
5t
9F
.
Discounted welfare losses W fOUT can be computed as the sum of (i) current and discounted
“transportation” costs, and (ii) entry costs. Welfare losses then boil down to
W fOUT = 2 (1 + δ)N
f
OUT t[
Z 1/3NfOUT
0
xdx+
Z 1/2NfOUT
1/3NfOUT
(1/NfOUT − x)dx)] +N
f
OUT (1 + δ)F
=
31
60
(1 + δ)
√
5tF .
The first term between the square brackets represents the customers travelling to the closest
firm whereas the second term within those brackets represents the customers visiting a more
distant supplier (as it offers a lower price). The last term represents the entry costs.
2.2.3 Social Planner
What is the optimal number of firms from a social welfare point of view with opt out? Suppose
that the social planner controls the (maximum) number of firms entering the market but cannot
control their oligopolistic pricing behavior once they have entered. As it is a dominant strategy
for firms to price discriminate between “close” and “distant” consumers, welfare losses to be
minimized are
WOUT = 2n (1 + δ) t[
Z 1/3n
0
xdx+
Z 1/2n
1/3n
(1/n− x)dx)] + nF (1 + δ) .
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Solving the first-order condition yields the optimal number of firms, n∗OUT , with
n∗OUT =
r
11t
36F
.
Substituting n∗OUT into WOUT yields as welfare losses
W ∗OUT = (1 + δ)
r
11tF
9
.
2.3 Anonymity
The third system we consider is anonymity. With anonymity, detailed personal consumer infor-
mation cannot be used. Firms therefore cannot access specific customer information, and are not
allowed to store such information and use it in the second period. Firms then need to practice
uniform pricing in both periods. It is clear that first- and second-period competition are not
linked. The reasoning is that first-period market shares do not affect second-period competition.
Therefore we can address first- and second-period competition independently of each other.
2.3.1 Oligopoly
Assume that N firms entered the market before competition starts. Firms are located symmet-
rically on the circle. As before, the distance between firms i and j in neighborhood ij equals
1/N . As firms offer only one price, there is only one indifferent consumer located at a such that
piτ + ta = p
j
τ + t(
1
N
− a),
where piand pj are the prices charged by firms i and j in period τ , respectively.
Firms i and j maximize their profits during period τ in the neighborhood ij
Πiτ (p
i, pj) ≡ piτa
Πjτ (p
j , pi) ≡ pjτ (1− a).
The (necessary and sufficient) first-order conditions are
piτ = 0.5(p
j
τ +
t
N
)
pjτ = 0.5(p
i
τ +
t
N
).
A symmetric solution implies
piτ = p
j
τ =
t
N
.
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The variable profits during period τ on neighborhood ij become
Πiτ = Π
j
τ =
t
2N2
.
2.3.2 Free Entry
The free entry number of firms with anonymity NfAN is determined by the following zero profit
condition
NfAN = (1 + δ)
t
N2
− (1 + δ)F = 0.
Recall that each firm obtains profits on two neighborhoods and in two periods. Firms also incur
fixed entry costs. The free-entry equilibrium number of firms NfAN then becomes
NfAN =
r
t
F
.
Welfare losses with anonymity W fAN become
W fAN = (1 + δ)
t
4NfAN
+NfAN (1 + δ)F
=
5
4
(1 + δ)
√
tF .
With anonymity, all consumers are served by their most preferred supplier. This is reflected
in the first term of the welfare losses as the average consumer travels 1
4NfAN
. The second term
represents the fixed entry costs.
2.3.3 Social Planner
With anonymity, a social planner minimizes the following welfare losses
WAN = (1 + δ)
t
4n
+ n (1 + δ)F.
Minimization yields n∗AN the socially optimal number of firms
n∗AN =
r
t
4F
.
Plugging this n∗AN into the welfare losses yields
W ∗AN = (1 + δ)
√
Ft.
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3 A Welfare Comparison of Privacy Policies
This section compares the results of the three different privacy policies with regard to the degree
of privacy protection each affords. As mentioned in the Introduction, opt out provides consumers
with the lowest degree of privacy protection, opt in offers an intermediate degree, and anonymity
results in the highest degree.
We first discuss the extent to which the different privacy policies result in excessive entry.
Next we discuss whether less excessive entry always leads to higher welfare by providing a
welfare comparison of free entry and the social planner. We also report on the extent to which
the oligopoly findings align with those under free entry. Finally, we discuss consumers’ behavior
when their costs in exercising the option for privacy protection are low. The proofs of the
Propositions directly follow from comparing the findings in Section 2 and are omitted.
The analysis of the welfare losses for the three different privacy policies under free entry and
the social planner yields the first Proposition.
Proposition 1: All privacy policies result in excessive entry. Excessive entry increases unam-
biguously according to the degree of privacy protection. Formally, we find that
NfAN > N
f
IN > N
f
OUT > n
∗
OUT > n
∗
IN > n
∗
AN .
Not surprisingly the anonymity regime yields excessive entry as it coincides with Salop’s
(1979) results; hence NfAN > n
∗
AN . The other two privacy policies allow for price discrimination
and lead to all-out competition (see Corts (1998)). Under both policies, firms make lower profits
and this dampens the excessive entry problem. More specifically, under the opt-out regime, all-
out competition occurs in both periods. With opt in, although first-period prices outweigh the
prices of the anonymity regime, second-period prices are sufficiently low to result in overall
all-out competition. Consequently, the discounted price P
f
an average consumer pays ranks as
P
f
AN > P
f
IN > P
f
OUT
for the three different regimes. This explains the free-entry ordering NfAN > N
f
IN > N
f
OUT .
The degree of privacy protection also determines the socially optimal number of firms. The
opt-in regime results in an inefficient allocation of consumers in the second period as some
consumers choose a more distant supplier. The social planner corrects for this consumer behavior
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by increasing the number of firms as this reduces the cost of inefficient allocation. Under the opt-
out regime this inefficient allocation occurs in both periods. This explains n∗OUT > n
∗
IN > n
∗
AN .
This shows that the degree of excessive entry increases unambiguously according to the degree
of privacy protection. Finally, note that lowering the degree of privacy protection only mitigates
the excessive entry problem but does not make it disappear, a result that further corroborates
the findings of Norman and Thisse (1996) and Bhaskar and To (2004) who also study the effect
of price discrimination on the free entry number of firms.14
Proposition 2: Privacy protection matters for social welfare. The free-entry analysis shows
that social welfare is non-monotonic in the degree of privacy protection. Opt out is the preferred
privacy policy while opt in underperforms the anonymity regime. The social planner unambigu-
ously prefers more privacy protection. Formally, we find that welfare losses rank as
W fIN > W
f
AN > W
f
OUT > W
∗
OUT > W
∗
IN > W
∗
AN .
The different privacy policies influence social welfare as they determine the number of en-
trants and the degree of efficient consumer allocation. The free-entry analysis reveals that opt
out socially outperforms anonymity. This insight stems from the following trade-off. On the one
hand, some consumers prefer to purchase from a more distant supplier. This inefficient allocation
does not occur in the anonymity regime where all consumers patronize the closest shop, lowering
social welfare. On the other hand, a significantly lower number of firms enter with opt out, as
has been shown in Proposition 1, thereby improving social welfare. The analysis shows that the
second effect dominates the first. Thus, although some consumers are not served by their most
preferred supplier, opt out sufficiently mitigates excessive entry to enhance total welfare.
In contrast, opt in reduces total welfare by comparison to anonymity. Two opposing effects
explain this finding. Opt in results in somewhat less excessive entry as opposed to anonymity,
and while this is certainly to the benefit of social welfare, it is not enough to outweigh the
inefficient allocation of consumers in the second period. The overall effect is that opt in reduces
social welfare, thus illustrating that opt in is not a convex combination of the anonymity and
opt-out regimes. Under opt in, firms strategically adopt an intertemporal pricing scheme where
first-period prices are higher than under anonymity and second-period prices lower than under
14 In a somewhat different model where consumers can be sorted according to their willingness to pay, Borenstein
(1985) predicts that the number of firms in a free-entry model increases with price discrimination. Similarly,
Holmes (1989) finds that when firms’ best-responses are symmetric, profits will increase with third-degree price
discrimination.
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opt out. Thus, welfare changes in a non-monotonic way according to the degree of privacy
protection. Under free entry, moving from the highest degree of privacy protection (anonymity)
towards an intermediate level of privacy protection (opt in) is socially harmful. However, the
lowest degree of privacy protection (opt out) is welfare improving as compared to anonymity.
Policymakers should, therefore, be in favor of a market for customer information.
Finally, when the social planner can control the number of firms as well as the degree of
privacy protection, it should favor the highest degree of privacy protection through anonymity
as this generates efficient consumer allocation.
Corollary: The degree of excessive entry is not a sufficient statistic to make welfare judgments.
Proposition 1 reveals that under opt in and opt out the equilibrium number of firms is
less excessive by comparison with anonymity. Proposition 2 shows that welfare with opt out
socially outperforms anonymity. However, opt in underperforms socially compared to anonymity.
Therefore, our analysis shows that welfare does not necessarily increase when the degree of excess
entry diminishes.
Proposition 3: The welfare ranking of privacy policies differs between oligopoly and free entry.
From Proposition 2 we know that welfare changes non-monotonically according to the degree
of privacy protection. In contrast, social welfare increases unambiguously with privacy protection
in oligopoly. The reasoning is that greater privacy protection increases the efficiency of consumer
allocation. The opt-out regime nicely illustrates how the welfare consequences of free entry and
oligopoly can be opposite. While opt out is clearly the most preferred privacy policy under
free entry, the welfare analysis under oligopoly shows the opposite result. Obviously, this result
stems from the fact that the oligopoly analysis takes the number of firms as fixed whereas with
free entry the number of firms becomes part of the analysis and is endogenously determined.
Our analysis so far assumes that consumers find it too costly to opt in or to opt out. However,
it may be true that in certain industries some consumers experience low or zero costs in exercising
their option. We now investigate what happens when consumers face zero costs. Consider first
the opt-out privacy policy. A consumer who opts out prevents information about him from
being used by firms in setting prices. In our model, consumers have no incentive to opt out
even with zero costs. The reasoning is that by opting out, the consumer prevents his personal
information from being marketed, with the result that the firm charges him a higher first-period
price. As a result, no consumer opts out. In contrast, with opt in and a zero exercising cost, all
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consumers have an incentive to exercise their option. The reasoning is that consumers benefit
from all-out competition in the first period, since by opting in a consumer’s personal information
is marketed. Suppose now that there were a small cost for exercising the option. Opting out
now becomes even more unattractive as the customer faces a price increase as well as the cost
of opting out. Consumers deciding to opt in, by contrast, weigh the cost of opting in against
the higher first-period price from not exercising the option; as long as this cost of exercising
the option is sufficiently low, consumers will opt in. The following Proposition, summarizes the
previous discussion.
Proposition 4: Consumers only opt in when the cost of exercising the option is sufficiently
low. Consumers never opt out.
4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this paper we study how public policy towards privacy influences social welfare. The property
rights approach to the economics of privacy shows that when the conditions of competitive
markets hold, ownership of personal consumer information will not affect the efficient amount of
information flow. Two commonly used privacy policies — opt in and opt out — allocate property
rights over personal information to the consumer. Under opt out, an important privacy policy
in the US, firms have access to marketed personal consumer information when the consumer
does not object. Opt in permits the use of personal information inside a firm but requires the
consumer’s explicit consent before this information can be disclosed to third parties outside
the firm. The European Union emphasizes the opt-in model. This paper identifies the welfare
effects of opt in and opt out in public policy towards privacy when consumers find it costly to
exercise their legal rights to manage their privacy. We investigate this policy issue employing
a two-period address model where the privacy policy affects firms’ access to personal consumer
information.
We find that when consumers find it costly to manage their privacy, these two privacy
policies shape social welfare differently. In particular, a privacy policy influences the number
of entrants and the degree of efficient consumer allocation. Our free-entry analysis shows that
social welfare is non-monotonic, depending on the degree of privacy protection. Opt out is
the socially preferred privacy policy. The anonymity benchmark, in which firms cannot rely
on any personal consumer information, outperforms opt in. Although the opt-out regime leads
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to inefficient consumer allocation — not all consumers buy from the socially optimal supplier—
opt out leads to all-out competition compared to anonymity, resulting in less excessive entry.
In contrast, opt in exhibits lower total welfare than anonymity. Welfare changes in a non-
monotonic way according to the degree of privacy protection. Putting some restrictions on
privacy, as with opt in, is socially more harmful than imposing complete privacy protection, as
happens under anonymity. However, the lowest degree of privacy protection (opt out) maximizes
social welfare. Policymakers should, therefore, realize that when consumers find the management
of their privacy costly, privacy policies matter for social welfare. In particular, our free-entry
analysis suggests that opt out is the socially preferred privacy policy when the property rights of
personal consumer information are allocated to the consumer and when managing these property
rights is costly.
Our free-entry analysis also yields two other results. First, the degree of excessive entry is
not a sufficient statistic to draw welfare conclusions. Social welfare is lower with opt in, although
excessive entry is mitigated by comparison with anonymity. Competition policy therefore needs
to address more than market structure only. Second, welfare results may substantially differ
between oligopoly and free entry. To illustrate this point, while it is clear that oligopoly results
in inefficient consumer allocation when considering opt out, our free entry analysis reverses this
result as all-out competition substantially reduces excess entry.
Our analysis builds on marketed information about whether or not consumers belong to
specific consumer segments. Firms, however, may have access to more detailed information than
we considered in our analysis. For example, information about consumers could be partitioned
into a larger number of market segments as in Liu and Serfes (2005). While their analysis
shows that competition increases up to a certain degree of consumer partitioning and decreases
thereafter, greater possibilities of engaging in price discrimination as compared to our setting
always result in fiercer competition. A more detailed partitioning of consumer information would
strengthen the result that opt out is the socially preferred privacy policy. The reasoning is that
fiercer price competition further reduces excessive entry and the extent of inefficient consumer
allocation.
Finally, we have limited our notion of privacy to Posner’s (1981) “concealment of infor-
mation.” Obviously, the other definitions of “peace and quiet” and “freedom and autonomy”
referred to by Posner could be incorporated by introducing a value for privacy into consumers’
utility functions. Our contribution, however, shows that in a model of localized competition,
consumers may benefit from lower prices. Eventually, policy makers must trade lower prices
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for consumers off against the value society attaches to “peace and quiet” and “freedom and
autonomy.”
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